Opportunistic Sports Franchise Relocations: Can Punitive Damages in Actions Based upon Contract Strike a Balance by Shropshire, Kenneth L.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-1989
Opportunistic Sports Franchise Relocations: Can
Punitive Damages in Actions Based upon Contract
Strike a Balance
Kenneth L. Shropshire
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kenneth L. Shropshire, Opportunistic Sports Franchise Relocations: Can Punitive Damages in Actions Based upon Contract Strike a
Balance, 22 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 569 (1989).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol22/iss2/3
OPPORTUNISTIC SPORTS FRANCHISE
RELOCATIONS: CAN PUNITIVE DAMAGES
IN ACTIONS BASED UPON CONTRACT
STRIKE A BALANCE?
Kenneth L. Shropshire*
I. INTRODUCTION
Professional sports leagues were established to privately govern the
major sports in the United States.' The individual team franchises in-
volved in each major sport have combined to establish these entities to
direct the financial success of their particular sport.2 To obtain a
franchise in a professional league, the individual owners must contractu-
ally agree to be controlled by the constitution and by-laws of that
league.3 The cooperation required under these league rules is often rec-
ognized as an important factor in bringing about the financial success of
professional sports leagues.'
Recent Ninth Circuit opinions concerning the right of a franchise to
move from its present home territory to another, coupled with "opportu-
nism"5 on the part of individual franchises, have eroded an important
* Assistant Professor, Department of Legal Studies, Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania. A.B., Stanford University, 1977, J.D., Columbia University School of Law,
1980. The author gratefully acknowledges Emeritus Professor Frederick G. Kempin, Jr. of the
Wharton School for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, and University of
Pennsylvania law student Gloria Johnson (Class of 1987), who rendered invaluable research
assistance.
1. 1 R. BERRY & G. WONG, LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES 1-4
(1986). The major sports leagues are: the National Football League (NFL); National Basket-
ball Association (NBA); National Hockey League (NHL); and Major League Baseball (MLB).
See id. at 3.
2. Id.
3. See, eg., N.F.L. CONST. & BY-LAws art. III (1986) (football); Atlanta Nat'l League
Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (baseball); Riko Enters. v.
Seattle Supersonics Corp., 357 F. Supp. 521, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (basketball); see also J.
WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 3.15, at 307-11 (1979) ("For the purpose of
analyzing most private law issues, it can be said that the basic relationship between clubs
within a league is one of contract.") Id. at 307.
4. See R. BERRY & G. WONG, supra note 1, at 40 wherein the authors state that: "The
four major team sports-football, baseball, basketball, and hockey-gross combined revenues
in excess of $1 billion per year."
5. The leading "opportunistic" case is National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club,
Inc., 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 362 (1987) [hereinafter Clippers]; see
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facet of league governance: the right of a league to determine the home
territory or city of a member franchise. In recent years, this problem has
affected baseball,6 football,7 basketball' and hockey.9 In the long run, a
loss of league control over franchise relocations could affect league opera-
tions and profits. 10
The constitutions and by-laws of all leagues require a franchise to
obtain league permission before moving." The league decides whether to
also Gray, Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Control Over NFL Franchise Locations, 25 AM.
Bus. L.J. 123 (1987). The term "opportunism" is often used by economists to identify unethi-
cal or crafty behavior. Professor Oliver Williamson defined it as "self interest seeking with
guile." 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND IIERARCHIES 26 (1975).
6. See Wong, Of Franchise Relocation, Expansion and Competition in Professional Team
Sports: The Ultimate Political Football?, 9 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 7, 27 (1985).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 138-65 and accompanying text.
11. League guidelines regarding relocations have become more extensive as courts have
continued to clarify what is permissible. The relevant NFL provision states in pertinent part:
The League shall have exclusive control of the exhibition of football games by mem-
ber clubs within the home territory of each member. No member club shall have the
right to transfer its franchise or playing site to a different city, either within or
outside its home territory, without prior approval by the affirmative vote of three-
fourths of the existing member clubs of the League.
NFL CONST. & BY-LAWS art. IV § 4.3 (1982).
In December of 1984, the NFL introduced an "objective" standard for evaluating pro-
posed franchise relocations. Professor Gray reports that the memorandum issued to NFL
team presidents stated the following:
The procedures implemented by the NFL require written notice, accompanied by a
statement of reasons, to the League by January 15th of the year of the proposed
relocation and provide to the team seeking relocation a full opportunity to present its
request directly to the NFL owners. An affirmative vote of three-fourths of current
owners is still required for league approval.
The statement of reasons must include the following information: a comparison
of team revenues with the league averages and medians; a comparison of past and
projected stadium revenues at the existing and proposed locations; audited annual
financial and profit and loss statements for the last four seasons; operations of other
professional and college sports in the existing and proposed locations; effects of the
relocation on scheduling patterns, travel requirements of other teams, divisional
alignments, traditional rivalries, TV patterns and interest, quality of stadium facili-
ties, and the perception of fans and the general public; copies of current stadium lease
and other current agreements regarding concessions, luxury boxes, scoreboard adver-
tising, parking, and practice facilities; an assessment of the suitability of the existing
stadium, cost of and prospects for improvement, and status of negotiations to achieve
changes; financial analysis of projected lease and other arrangements in proposed
locations as compared with those in the existing location; and budget projections for
the first three years in the new location.
See Gray, supra note 5, at 141-42 (citing NFL Memorandum to NFL Presidents, n.62, Dec.
21, 1984); see also Wong, supra note 6, at 55 n.195 (citing NFL in New Policy, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 30, 1984 § 5, at 1, col. 1). Prior to the initial decision in the Raiders' litigation, Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984) [hereinafter Raiders 1], the NBA Constitution contained no
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permit a move based on the best interests of all the league member-
franchises. 12
Initially, when leagues acted aggressively to bar relocations, courts
supported their actions. 3 In recent years, however, the leagues have
been unsuccessful when a franchise has challenged a league denial of a
relocation request. 4 In fact, leagues have become so frustrated that
when the National Football League owners voted to allow the Cardinals
franchise to move from St. Louis to Phoenix, one owner was prompted to
remark, "[t]his move isn't our doing... [t]he free agency occurred in
court ....15 The "free agency" that the owner referred to was not the
right of star athletes to play for the highest bidder but that of a sports
franchise to move to the city that guaranteed it the highest revenues. 6
objective standards. NBA CONST. & BY-LAws art. IX, (as in effect at the commencement of
the 1984-85 season, Oct. 26, 1984). The rule provided:
A membership shall not be granted or transferred for operation within the Territory
of any Member without the prior written consent of such Member. Anything herein
contained to the contrary notwithstanding, this provision as to territorial restrictions
may be amended only with the consent of all the Members of the Association.
Id. Today, the same rule in the NBA Constitution includes the relocation guidelines devel-
oped in the Raiders litigation. See NBA CONST. & BY-LAWs art. 9A, cited in Wong, supra
note 6, at 55 n.198.
The leagues know best how to regulate themselves. This is reflected not only from the
necessity of working together to produce a "product," but also from the public relations stand-
point of continuing to market the product to municipalities and fans. The leagues obviously
strive to increase the value of the product or to maintain it at the highest possible level. See
Noll, The Economics of Sports Leagues, Stanford University Discussion Paper No. 141, at 33
(1987) (regarding overall league decisions concerning the location of franchises, "[t]he distri-
bution of teams through the country affects the national popularity of a sport, particularly its
television ratings, and hence the value of national broadcasting rights to all members.").
Congress has been reluctant to pass legislation that would exempt sports from antitrust
scrutiny regarding this single relocation issue. Commentators have noted that in all likelihood,
"Congress will at length do nothing and leave the disposition of the antitrust problems to the
courts under existing law." R. BERRY, W. GOULD & P. STAUDOHAR, LABOR RELATIONS IN
PRoFassioNAL SPORTS 255-56 (1986). However, with the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
in the Raiders' litigation, and the settlement of the Los Angeles Clippers' litigation, many are
looking once again to Congress for relocation guidelines. Sports Indus. News, Oct. 9, 1987, at
314.
12. See supra note 11.
13. See, eg., San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D.
Cal. 1974).
14. See cases cited infra note 19 and accompanying text.
15. The team owner made this statement in reference to the confusion caused by court
decisions in this area and the owners' fear of a major antitrust damage award against them.
Eskenazi, N.F.L Votes to Approve Cardinals' Move West, N.Y. Times, March 16, 1988, at B9,
col. 3.
The NFL begrudgingly granted the Cardinals football franchise the right to relocate to
Phoenix, Arizona from St. Louis, Missouri, with 26 owners voting in favor of the relocation,
none opposed, and 2 abstaining. Id.
16. The Philadelphia Eagles franchise is an example of the type of profitable arrangement
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"The recent phenomenon of the relocation of sports franchises to differ-
ent cities" is known as "franchise free agency." 17
One element responsible for sports franchise free agency is the fear
of large antitrust damage awards being levied against sports leagues
under the Sherman Act.s In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commis-
sion v. National Football League,19 the most celebrated sports franchise
relocation case, the Ninth Circuit granted a multi-million dollar treble
damage award to the Los Angeles Raiders franchise after determining
that the League's decision not to allow the franchise to relocate was un-
reasonable and, therefore, violated the antitrust laws.20
If the value of all franchise locations were equal, league governance
would not be so problematic. However, of the approximately two dozen
professional franchise locations in this country, some are clearly more
profitable than others.21 The factors affecting the revenue potential of a
location are numerous. They include: the size of the stadium and, thus,
potential ticket revenues; the terms of the stadium lease agreement; and
the local television and radio market value.22
Attractive profit potential in other municipalities has caused some
that can be negotiated. By threatening to relocate the franchise to Phoenix, Arizona, the or-
ganization negotiated a lease with the city of Philadelphia in 1984 running through 2011,
including a ten-year rent deferment. Tose Will Keep Eagles in Philadelphia, Asbury Park
(N.J.) Press, Dec. 16, 1984, at IC, col. 2.
Lease arrangements in professional sports vary widely. In fact, municipalities often sacri-
fice millions in rental income in order to lure or retain a franchise. This type of arrangement
has been referred to as the "superstadium game." See D. HARRIS, THE LEAGUE: THE RISE
AND DECLINE OF THE NFL 24-25 (1986). The concept basically requires a team owner to
play different stadium authorities against each other in order to bid down the cost of leasing a
facility. Other prerequisites have included the building of stadiums to attract new franchises,
See Sports Indus. News, Oct. 9, 1987, at 318 ($7 million in stadium improvements needed to
attract baseball expansion franchise); Jacksonville Scouted, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1987, at 18B,
col. 2 (Jacksonville offers $125.8 million package to Houston Franchise of National Football
League); see also Attmer, The Battle of Baltimore, The Sporting News, Sept. 28, 1987, at 9;
Stellino, The Stadium Game: NFL's New Lure, The Sporting News, Aug. 10, 1987, at 44
(Atlanta and Houston franchises of the NFL using offers from Jacksonville, Florida officials as
leverage in their respective stadium lease negotiations).
17. See G. UBERSINE, COVERING ALL THE BASES: A COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH
GUIDE TO SPORTS LAW 221 (1985).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The Sherman Act provides that "[e]very contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal" and is a felony punish-
able by fine and/or imprisonment. Id.
19. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); see also Los Angeles Me-
morial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 92 (1987) [hereinafter Raiders fl].
20. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1401.
21. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
22. See Noll, supra note 11, at 30.
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franchises to contemplate breaking, and others to actually break, league
relocation rules.23 One franchise, the National Basketball Association's
Clippers, did not even seek the permission allegedly required by the
NBA's rules-it simply moved from San Diego to Los Angeles.24 The
litigation that arose after the Clippers' move gave sports franchises an
even clearer perspective on their right to circumvent league
governance.25
Case law maintains that if a franchise relocates without first ob-
taining league permission, the franchise is only required to compensate
the league for the difference in the estimated fair market value of the
franchise expansion opportunity taken, less the estimated fair market
value of the franchise location abandoned by the relocating franchise.26
In other words, an individual franchise may act opportunistically by
making an economic assessment of a relocation opportunity without re-
gard to the desires or the best interests of the league as a whole.27 This
sort of individual action appears to contradict the traditional, as well as
successful, financial operation of professional sports leagues. 28 The indi-
vidual leagues have rules in place that when applied objectively should
23. See supra text accompanying notes 16 & 19; see, e.g., Clippers, 815 F.2d at 564-65.
24. Id. at 564.
25. Id. at 565. The court stated that a league's rules that require relocations by individual
member franchises do not automatically violate antitrust laws. Id. at 567-68. The court did
state, however, that relocation actions must be assessed under a rule of reason analysis. Id. at
567. See infra text accompanying notes 89-123 for a discussion of the Clippers litigation.
26. See Raiders II, 791 F.2d at 1371-74.
27. See, e.g., Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1395-96; Clippers, 815 F.2d at 568-69.
28. Franchises of the National Football League reportedly share 97% of their revenues.
Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S. 2784 and S. 2821 Before the Senate
Comm. on Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 43-44 (1982). According to National Football
League Commissioner Pete Rozelle,
[T]here are forms of revenue sharing, not all of it equal. The television [revenue] ...
is shared equally .... On the gate, you keep 60 percent when you play at home; the
visitor gets 40 percent. The clubs have their own local radio rights and preseason
television ights .... Our marketing income is shared from our film company and
from our NFL properties [which include a] merchandising and publishing entity. So,
97 percent of it [revenue] is shared, not all equally, but a great preponderance of it
equally.
Id. Others have cited the importance of these revenue sharing provisions, particularly to the
survival of franchises in smaller media markets. See Morris, In the Wake of The Flood, 38
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 95 (1973). For an economic analysis, see Quirk & El Hodiri,
The Economic Theory of a Professional Sports League, in GOVERNmENT AND THE SPORTS
BUSINESS 33, 34 (R. Noll ed. 1974). Regarding the sharing of revenues in other leagues, see R.
BERRY, W. GOULD & P. STAUDOHAR, supra note 11. A key element in motivating opportu-
nistic relocations are those location-based revenues that are not shared equally. In all sports
other than football, gate receipts are the largest source of income. These ticket sales and con-
cession revenues can cause a variation in revenues among teams, and make another location
look more attractive to an individual franchise. Noll, supra note 11, at 30.
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serve the best interests of all league members.2 9
As this Article discusses, the Ninth Circuit litigation involving the
Los Angeles Raiders has had a "chilling effect" on league governance.30
The subsequent Clippers litigation did nothing to improve a league's abil-
ity to govern itself.31 This Article examines how the current status of the
law allows individual franchises to circumvent the league constitutions
and by-laws.32 In examining the franchise-league relationship, the Arti-
cle concludes that past court decisions citing the deep financial interde-
pendence of the parties indicate that the league-franchise relationship is
fiduciary in nature.33  This fiduciary relationship arises because each
party depends on the other for financial success. Obviously, cooperation
is needed on the most basic level, from scheduling to determining how
revenues should be shared.34
When a fiduciary relationship exists, certain rights and remedies are
available by law.35 One remedy that is becoming increasingly available
for contract breaches involving fiduciary relationships is punitive dam-
ages.36 This Article examines the role that punitive damages may play in
deterring franchise free agency and the opportunistic takings of league-
developed geographic franchise opportunities.37 Just as the punitive por-
tion of treble damages in antitrust actions has had a chilling effect on
league actions denying franchise relocation requests, punitive damages
flowing from a franchise's breach of contract may serve to bar opportu-
nistic takings by individual league members.38
Part I of this Article reviews the leading sports franchise relocation
cases as a framework for analysis. Part II briefly reviews the effect of
these cases on leagues and franchises. Part III examines damages as a
deterrent to opportunistic franchise relocations. The initial discussion in
Part III attempts to establish that, at a minimum, a league has a right to
be compensated for the geographic location taken. Generally, theories
associated with usurpation of a partnership opportunity are used to illus-
29. See infra notes 138-65 and accompanying text.
30. Raiders II, 791 F.2d at 1371-74; see also infra notes 35-80 and accompanying text.
31. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 568-70; see also infra notes 89-123 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 124-37 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 138-65 and accompanying text. A fiduciary is defined as "a person
holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a trustee, in respect to
the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor which it
requires." BLACK'S LAW DICoNARY 563 (5th ed. 1979).
34. See R. BERRY & G. WONG, supra note 1, at 1-4.
35. See infra notes 166-222 and accompanying text.
36. See Sebert, infra note 175, at 1600-29; see also infra text accompanying note 52.
37. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
38. Id
[Vol. 22:569
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trate this. The section then discusses why expanding the availability of
punitive damages into litigation involving leagues and franchises would
deter opportunistic franchise relocations. Part IV discusses a franchise
relocation hypothetical applying some of the principles previously set
forth.
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Raiders I and II: Unreasonable Denials of Relocation Requests
In general, when an owner of a professional sports team obtains or is
granted a franchise within a league, that owner is required to pay a
franchise fee and must agree to abide by league rules.39 In exchange, the
franchisee generally receives a non-assignable, exclusive home territory,
one vote on the league decision-making board and a share of the league
revenues.
4o
In the leading sports franchise relocation case, Los Angeles Memo-
rial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League,41 involving the
now Los Angeles Raiders and the National Football League, the manag-
ing partner of the then-Oakland Raiders, Al Davis, made a modem-day
business decision that his franchise would have more economic success in
the Los Angeles market than in Oakland.42 In 1978, the Los Angeles
Rams franchise moved to Anaheim, a city approximately fifty miles
39. See NFL CONST. & BY-LAws art. III-V.
40. Id.
41. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
42. Id. at 1384. The relocation of sports franchises is not a recent phenomenon. Reloca-
tion of franchises occurred frequently in the early days of both professional football and bas-
ketball. As one author notes:
Contrary to popular belief, the movement of franchises is not something that began
in the 1950's.... Cities won and lost teams as rival leagues in those sports warred.
Large and medium-size cities such as Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, St. Louis
and Toronto were affected, as were smaller communities such as Anderson, Oshkosh,
Sheboygan, and Waterloo.
Johnson, Municipal Administration and the Sports Franchise Relocation Issue, PuB. ADMiN.
REv. 519 (Nov./Dec. 1983); see also Wong, supra note 6, at 22.
These early moves occurred primarily for economic reasons. Teams moved because of
either unstable financial conditions or to join a new league. Id. at 24. A new era began in 1958
when both the Brooklyn Dodgers and the New York Giants moved west to Los Angeles and
San Francisco respectively. Neither of these franchises relocated because of unstable financial
conditions or to join a new league. When these franchises departed New York, both were
doing quite well financially. Id at 24-25. These franchises moved, in large part, because their
owners determined that relocating would allow them even greater prosperity. As one com-
mentator observed, "the franchise relocation issue had developed a new dimension-a move
based on economic and business advantages of the new location and not the economic failures
of the previous location." Id at 25. Other commentators have characterized these moves as
"opportunistic" franchise relocations. See Gray, supra note 5 at 124 n.6. We have since seen a
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south of Los Angeles. This left a vacancy in one of the most profitable
NFL markets.43
The desire to relocate the Raiders to Los Angeles was not Davis'
alone. The Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission (LAMCC),
which managed the facility that the Rams had vacated, wanted to obtain
a new tenant. In fact, the initial legal action in this relocation saga was
instituted by the LAMCC when it sought an injunction in federal court
to prevent the NFL from blocking a move by the Raiders to Los
Angeles.'
The major barrier to relocation was NFL rule 4.3.45 That provision
of the NFL Constitution requires three-fourths of the League's clubs to
approve a franchise relocation to a municipality that has an existing NFL
franchise.46 The initial LAMCC action sought, essentially, to invalidate
rule 4.3. LAMCC contended that rule 4.3 constituted a "contract" that
violated the Sherman Act.4 7
In initial interpretations of the Sherman Act, courts determined that
a blanket ban on "every" contract that restrained trade in any way was
inappropriate and not what Congress had intended in passing the Act.48
number of relocations, both contested and uncontested by their respective leagues, for reasons
other than financial problems or the formation of new leagues.
Although relocation is not new, litigation over such moves is a fairly recent phenomenon.
San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974), was
the first relocation litigation. Interestingly, it too involved a California-based franchise, the
National Hockey League San Francisco Seals.
In San Francisco'Seals, the San Francisco franchise of the NHL desired to relocate to
Vancouver, Canada. A private antitrust action was brought by the San Francisco Seals owner
against the NHL and all other member clubs for barring their relocation to Vancouver. Id. at
967.
The court viewed as a key issue whether the member clubs competed on an economic
basis. The absence of economic competition indicates a single entity; without a duality of
actors there can be no violation of the antitrust laws. Id. at 969. Not only was San Francisco
Seals a case of first impression, but it was also unique because it was one of the few times that
the "single entity" argument was successful in a sports antitrust action. Another instance in
which the argument was successful at the district court level was NASL v. NFL, 505 F. Supp.
659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 670 F.2d 1429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982). In San
Francisco Seals, the court did not allow the franchise to relocate to Vancouver. San Francisco
Seals, 379 F. Supp. at 967-71.
43. Cardozo & Mishkin, Does a League Have the Right to Determine Where Teams Play?,
Nat'l L.J., Nov. 30, 1987 at 24, col. 1.
44. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1385.
45. NFL CONST. & BY-LAWS art. IV § 4.3 (1982). See supra note 11 for text and discus-
sion of Rule 4.3.
46. Id.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
48. See, eg., Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Although
the application of the rule of reason to the regulation of sports franchise relocations has not
always been clear, the Ninth Circuit has added a degree of finality in this area. With the
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Therefore, the courts adopted a "rule of reason" which typically requires
a court to determine whether the agreement in question causes an unrea-
sonable restraint on competition based on the circumstances of the
case.
4 9
The district court denied the initial injunction sought by LAMCC
because at the time the action was brought, the move by the .Raiders, or
any other franchise, was not yet near fruition. 0 Subsequently, LAMCC
returned to court when the Raiders' move to Los Angeles appeared prob-
able.51 In that action, the court granted LAMCC an injunction barring
the NFL from asserting rule 4.3 to prevent the Raiders from moving to
Raiders decisions, the rules regarding franchise relocations in the NFL and the NBA are, at
least on their face, valid. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1390-98, Raiders II, 791 F.2d at 1363-65. The
Ninth Circuit added, however, that scrutiny of the application of these league rules to specific
relocations is appropriate. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1394-98. This result follows from the court's
holding that a sports league, for antitrust analysis, is not a single entity and therefore is subject
to antitrust scrutiny. See id. at 1387-90. Courts have recognized the need for some concerted
action between the individual franchises within a league in order to insure efficient and profita-
ble operation for the entire league. At the same time, however, courts are convinced that the
franchises operate in an economic manner separate enough to be scrutinized to insure only a
necessary level of concerted action. Presently, a sports league is not considered to be a single
entity for antitrust purposes.
Senator Arlen Specter introduced the Professional Sports Community Protection Act of
1987, which provided a set of objective relocation guidelines. S. 782, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987). In introducing his compromise legislation, Senator Specter stated: "I urge my col-
leagues to join me in supporting a compromise proposal now, when there are no proposed
relocations pending or under discussion, and we are thus free to approach the issue objec-
tively." 133 CONG. REc. S3511 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1987) (statement of Sen. Specter). The bill
represents a compromise of earlier legislative proposals. For discussions of earlier legislative
proposals, see generally Gray, supra note 5; Note, Professional Sports Team Relocations" The
Oakland Raider's Antitrust Case and Beyond, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 283 (1986); Wong, supra note
6.
Even a league commissioner, basketball's David Stem, has rejected a complete antitrust
exemption as the solution. In qualifying this view, he stated: "I think that the professional
sports leagues can be properly regulated by the antitrust laws ... if the actual business of the
sports league is properly understood by the courts." Interview with David Stern, NBA Commis-
sioner, 1 ANTITRusT 3, 24 (Summer 1987).
49. During initial applications of the Sherman Act, courts determined that a blanket ban
on "every" contract that restrained trade in any way was inappropriate and surely not what
Congress had intended; thus, a "rule of reason" was adopted. See United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) (Sherman Act forbids all restraint of interstate commerce without
exception); Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (Sherman Act
should be construed in light of reason); see also Cardozo & Mishkin, supra note 43, at 24.
50. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 468 F. Supp.
154 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980).
51. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 484 F. Supp.
1274 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980). At various times, LAMCC also delib-
erated regarding moves by the Minnesota Vikings, St. Louis Cardinals and Philadelphia Ea-
gles. See generally, D. HARRIS, supra note 16.
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Los Angeles.52 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that LAMCC had
not shown the probability of irreparable harm, which is a prerequisite to
the granting of an injunction. 3
Following protracted negotiations with LAMCC and the denial of
permission to move by the NFL, Davis determined that it would be ad-
vantageous to enter into an agreement with LAMCC to move the Oak-
land Raiders to Los Angeles. On March 1, 1980, Davis, representing the
Raiders' organization, signed a "Memorandum of Agreement" with
LAMCC agreeing to terms for the Raiders' move to Los Angeles. 4 Nine
days later, on March 10, 1980, the NFL owners voted twenty-two to
zero, with five abstentions, to bar the Raiders' move to Los Angeles, pur-
suant to rule 4.3.55
Following the NFL's negative vote, LAMCC renewed its action
against the NFL and its member clubs.5 6 In addition, the Raiders cross-
claimed and the team was aligned by the court as a plaintiff in the
action.5 7
At the trial court level, the initial trial resulted in a hung jury and a
mistrial.5 8 The second trial resulted in a damage award of $11.55 million
to the Raiders for the antitrust violation, trebled to $34.6 million pursu-
ant to 15 U.S.C. section 15.11 The trial court determined that the league
was not a single entity and that by not allowing the Raiders to relocate
the league had committed an antitrust violation.' The judge issued an
injunction that, after two years of delay, allowed the Raiders to move to
Los Angeles.61 The Raiders were also awarded another $11.55 million in
actual contract damages for a breach by the NFL of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. 2 LAMCC was awarded $4.86 mil-
lion for the antitrust violation to the stadium, trebled to $14.6 million.63
52. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 484 F. Supp. at 1278.
53. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 634 F.2d at 1203-04.
54. Davis signed the agreement and then proceeded to announce his intentions to move to
Los Angeles in a March 3, 1980 meeting of the NFL owners. RaidersI, 726 F.2d at 1385. The
ensuing lawsuits included an eminent domain action by the city of Oakland. See City of Oak-
land v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 606, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
55. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1385.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d
1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 92 (1987).
60. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1385.
61. Id. at 1386.
62. Id.
63. Id.
[Vol. 22:569
January 1989] SPORTS FRANCHISE RELOCATIONS
1. Raiders I
The trial and the appeals were bifurcated, and the liability and dam-
age issues were reviewed separately." Raiders I focused on liability is-
sues6" whereas Raiders II focused on damages.66
In the initial liability portion of the appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the district court's decision that the NFL was not a single entity, and
that application of the rule of reason in analyzing the antitrust issues was
proper.6 7 The court then confronted the issue of whether the rule requir-
ing league permission to relocate, as applied, was unreasonable. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that the league had
applied rule 4.3 to the Raiders in an unreasonable manner.
Regarding NFL rule 4.3, the court stated that the guidelines must
set forth standards that are clear, including a "procedural mechanism"
for reviewing a franchise relocation request.69 The court suggested that
factors such as "population, economic projections, facilities, [and] re-
gional balance" be considered when reviewing requests. 70 The court
noted further that "fan loyalty and location continuity" should be con-
sidered.7" In addition, the court noted that the league should provide the
team desiring to relocate with procedures for presenting its case.72
2. Raiders II
In Raiders II, the final appeal in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1385.
66. 791 F.2d 1356.
67. 726 F.2d at 1387.
68. Id. at 1390-98. The district court cited three reasons for holding that the NFL was not
a single entity: first, the fear that declaring that the NFL was a single entity would impliedly
grant the league blanket immunity from future antitrust actions; second, other entities that
produced a product that was just as unitary as the NFL's had been found to violate the Sher-
man Act; third, that the argument of a single entity was based on a "false premise"-that the
NFL member "clubs are not separate business entities whose products have an independent
value." Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 519 F. Supp.
581, 583-84 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
69. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1397.
70. Id.; see also, Kurlantzick, Thoughts of Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 15
CoNN. L. REv. 183, 206-07 (1983), suggesting more extensive guidelines including "popula-
tion, income statistics, and the number of college teams in the area." Kurlantzick also notes
that Major League Baseball will consider blocking a relocation only if the population of the
city to which the team desires to relocate has a population of less than 2.4 million. Id. at 206;
Major League Rule 1(c); Gray, supra note 5, at 140.
71. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1397.
72. Id. Following Raiders I, both the NFL and the NBA issued new guidelines regarding
relocations. They include the major factors suggested by the court. See, eg., NBA CoNsT. &
BY-LAWs art. 9A, cited in Wong, supra note 6, at 55 n.198.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Commission v. National Football League, the primary issue was whether
the damage awards were appropriate.73 Specifically, the court examined
whether the trebled antitrust damage award of $34.6 million to the Raid-
ers should be offset by the value of the Los Angeles franchise opportunity
received by the Raiders, minus the value of the vacated Oakland
franchise location.74 In addition, if offset was proper, the court had to
decide whether the offset should occur before or after trebling of the
damage award." The court determined that offset was appropriate and
should occur prior to trebling, thus reducing the size of the antitrust
award.
76
The other damage issue reviewed by the court of appeals was
whether the trial court's award of damages to the Raiders for the league's
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contract
was appropriate. 77 The court concluded that such damages were inap-
propriate since both parties had breached their duty to act in good
faith.78
a. antitrust offset
In effect, offset before trebling would have reduced or completely
nullified the $11.55 million award that the Raiders won in the trial court.
In testimony, Raiders owner Al Davis specifically stated that the net
value of the Raiders franchise increased by $25 million simply by moving
to Los Angeles and surrendering the Oakland franchise.79 If this is an
accurate estimate, the Raiders may have been required to pay the NFL
approximately $13.5 million rather than recover damages. If the offset
came after trebling, however, the Raiders damage award would still have
been approximately $9.5 million.
Regarding this dramatic difference, the court stated that, "assuming
that their award of monetary damages will be wholly offset, there is noth-
mng necessarily wrong with a 'damage assessment producing no net recov-
ery.' "8o Thus, the law is satisfied because an antitrust violation has been
proved and the illegal activity enjoined.
73. Raiders II, 791 F.2d at 1360.
74. Id. at 1366.
75. Id. at 1366-68.
76. Id. at 1374.
77. Id. at 1361; see also infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
78. Id. at 1361-63.
79. l at 1371.
80. Id. at 1374 (citing Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1127, 1136 (1976)).
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b. breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
California is one of a growing number of states that recognizes a tort
cause of action known as the breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. This covenant is implied in all contracts. The leading
California case is Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia,81 wherein the California Supreme Court stated "[ilt is well settled
that, in California, the law implies in every contract a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing." 2
In Raiders II, the court stated that a plaintiff could not succeed in
an action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing where
both parties had acted in bad faith.83 The court recognized elements of
bad faith both in the league's denial of the Raiders' relocation request, as
well as in the Raiders' notifying the NFL that the franchise had "offi-
cially and unilaterally moved" without league permission. 4 In holding
that the jury was incorrect in its findings, the court drew an analogy with
the standard equitable principles associated with the doctrine of unclean
hands.8 5 The court stated that the evidence presented permitted only one
of two possible conclusions: that either both parties breached the cove-
nant or neither did.86 The court did not acknowledge the possibility that
the NFL had alone breached, as the jury concluded. Therefore, the court
ordered that on remand, the NFL motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict should be reversed, and the award of $11.55 million to the
Raiders vacated.87
Although determined to be inapplicable in the Raiders case, this Ar-
ticle will show that the law regarding a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing may play a key role in modem day opportunistic
franchise relocations. 8
B. Clippers: Opportunistic Franchise Relocations
The litigation revolving around the National Basketball Association
Clippers' franchise move from San Diego to Los Angeles adds further
judicial gloss to opportunistic sports franchise relocation law. The now
Los Angeles Clippers have been one of the most mobile professional
81. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
82. Id. at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362; see infra text accompanying notes
198-211.
83. Raiders II, 791 F.2d at 1361.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1362-63.
86. Id. at 1361.
87. Id. at 1363.
88. See infra notes 198-211 and accompanying text.
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sports franchises in the past two decades. The franchise originated as the
Buffalo Braves, and was admitted into the NBA in 1970.89 In a move
that characterizes the restless personality of the franchise, the owner of
the Boston Celtics, Irving Levin, traded that multiple NBA champion-
ship title winning Boston Celtics franchise for the Buffalo Braves in 1978,
and proceeded to move the Buffalo Braves franchise to San Diego where
the team was christened the "Clippers." 90
Successful Beverly Hills attorney and real estate investor Donald
Sterling subsequently obtained the San Diego Clippers franchise. After
an unprofitable year of operation in San Diego, he tried to move the team
to Los Angeles. 91 After some contemplation, and a suit filed by the
NBA,92 Sterling decided to remain in San Diego.
When Alan Rothenberg became president of the Clippers franchise,
he noted that at the time there was "a feeling of despair, if not despera-
tion, in San Diego, we couldn't give tickets away, we lost our television
contract, [and] our radio broadcasts were tape-delayed." 93 With no fi-
nancial improvement in sight and following the success of the Los Ange-
les Raiders in court, Rothenberg announced in a press conference on
May 15, 1984 at the Los Angeles Sports Arena that the Clippers had
moved their franchise to Los Angeles. 94 He stated that their games
would be played in the Los Angeles Sports Arena, which, ironically, is a
facility adjacent to the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum and managed by
LAMCC.95 In addition, Rothenberg specifically stated that he did not
foresee any legal problems, even though the Clippers had not sought
league approval prior to the move, which the NBA alleged was required
by the NBA Constitution.96 Rothenberg stated, "I don't think the
league's going to say no. In my opinion, the Raiders' decision has some-
thing to do with it."97
The NBA did not act immediately to bar the move, no doubt con-
scious of the recent multi-million dollar award in Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Commission v. National Football League.98 Instead, NBA
89. Lancaster, Hoop Headaches: LA. Clippers Show Perils of Owning Pro Team, Wall St.
J., Apr. 17, 1987, § 2, at 18, col. 4.
90. Id
91. Id.
92. National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc. [Clippers], 815 F.2d 562, 564
(9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 362 (1987).
93. Lancaster, supra note 89, § 2, at 18, col. 4.
94. Clippers Moving to Los Angeles, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1984, § II, at B12, col. 3.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct., 92 (1987).
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Commissioner David Stern stated that the move would "be studied by a
special committee" prior to the league taking any specific action.99 The
N-BA even scheduled the Clippers' home games for the upcoming season
in Los Angeles."c°
On June 15, 1984 the NBA filed an action for a declaratory judg-
ment in federal district court against the Clippers for relocating to Los
Angeles from San Diego in violation of the NBA Constitution. In Na-
tional Basketball Association v. SDC Basketball Club,1"' (Clippers), the
NBA sought a declaratory judgment claiming that the NBA could con-
sider a member-franchise's relocation without violating antitrust laws
and that the NBA could impose a charge for the "unilateral usurpation
of the 'franchise opportunity' available in the Los Angeles market."10 2
The Clippers cross-complained, contending that the league rules on
relocation violated the Sherman Act. 103 In the voluminous action, sev-
eral initial motions for summary judgment were denied."° Then, on the
heels of the Raiders I decision, the court granted a motion by the Clip-
pers to dismiss.'0 5 The district court judge did not write an opinion even
though NBA counsel requested that he do so." 6 The judge stated only
that the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit would not heed what he
had to say and that he could not "see spending my time.., on this case
without instruction from the circuit.'
10 7
On appeal, the case was reviewed by the Ninth Circuit,0 8 the court
that had reviewed the Raiders' cases. In its opinion, the court re-af-
firmed some of the statements it had made in Raiders I and Raiders I1.109
The court stated that a league's rules that regulate relocations by mem-
ber franchises do not automatically violate the antitrust laws. 10 The
court stated, however, that actions on relocations are subject to a Sher-
man Act rule of reason analysis."' No rule of reason analysis had been
performed by the trial court." 2 The Ninth Circuit found that there were
99. Clippers Moving to Los Angeles, supra note 94, § II, at B12, col. 3.
100. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 568.
101. 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987).
102. Id. at 563.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); see supra note 18.
104. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 565.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 563.
107. Id. at 565.
108. Id. at 562.
109. Id at 564.
110. Id. at 567-68.
111. Id at 567.
112. Id at 567-68.
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outstanding questions of fact in the case and therefore reversed the sum-
mary judgment and remanded the case.'
13
The court then distinguished the application of the breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing at issue in this case from
its application in Raiders 11.114 In Raiders II, the court had found that
either both parties violated the covenant or that neither did. 15 In Clip-
pers, the court noted that the factual circumstances surrounding the relo-
cation differed markedly from that of the Raiders' case. 1 6 The Clippers
had moved without seeking league approval first, by simply announcing
to the league that the franchise would be, from that point on, playing its
home games in Los Angeles. The NBA did not respond, as did the NFL,
by attempting to block the relocation by the Clippers.11 7 Since it was
unclear which party, if any, had breached the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, the court remanded this issue for determination by the district
court. 
118
The court also did not determine whether the Clippers had usurped
a league-franchise opportunity. The panel found the Raiders' case inap-
plicable on this issue,119 reasoning that the offset ordered in Raiders II
related to the appropriate size of an antitrust award and whether an off-
set against any antitrust award was appropriate.1 20 The court noted that
the majority in Raiders II "revealed nothing about the origin of the off-
set" and that a basis for damages for the Clippers' alleged usurpation of a
league-franchise opportunity had to be found elsewhere.1 21 The court
pointed to the express or implied provisions of the league constitution as
the probable source of the basis for damages.1 22 Before this issue could
be decided on remand, the parties settled out of court.
123
III. THE AFTERMATH: How HAVE PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
LEAGUES AND FRANCHISES REACTED?
The net result of the Raiders' and Clippers' litigation is "franchise
113. Id. at 570.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 569-70 (citing Raiders II, 791 F.2d at 1362-63).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 568.
118. Id. at 569-70.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 570.
122. Id.
123. See Cardozo & Mishkin, supra note 43, reporting a settlement payment by the Clippers
to the NBA of $5.6 million.
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free agency." '124 The Clippers court passed up the opportunity to rule on
the legality of league rules pertaining to relocation. This lack of judicial
guidance left league officials with only the general guidelines set forth in
Raiders I,2' and the strong indication by the Clippers court that those
teams that did relocate would have to compensate their leagues for the
geographic location taken.'26
The franchises, leagues and even municipalities and fans may be
harshly affected by the Raiders and Clippers cases.' 27 Oakland, Balti-
more, St. Louis and other cities that have lost franchises presently have
no legal recourse to regain them.'28 The threat of treble damages, cou-
pled with only the obligation to pay for a relocation, will have a major
124. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see, eg., Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1395-98.
125. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 121 and accompanying text; see also Clippers, 815 F.2d at 570.
127. See Lancaster, Football-Hungry Cities Feign Cool But Hustle Hard to Get Pro Team,
Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1985, at 31, col. 4. Although the direct and immediate financial impact is
important and persuasive, many journalists point simply to the effect of the city no longer
maintaining "big league" status.
Behind this clash of economic interests and civic egos is the concept of being "big
league," an idea that confers on a city an intangible but invaluable image of influence
and sophistication.... But if you lose a professional team, you're viewed in the eyes
of some as a city that once was but maybe ain't no more.
Roberts, The Importance of Where Pros Play the Game, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1986, at A16,
col. 3.
A number of studies have been conducted showing the value a sports franchise has, has
had, or will have to a given community. See id. Similarly, a study of the economy in Jackson-
ville, Florida indicates that a professional football franchise would generate $60 million annu-
ally for the Jacksonville economy. Sports Indus. News, Oct. 9, 1987, at 318. But cf, Noll,
supra note 22, at 32 stating that these financial claims "[flor the most part... are vastly
overblown"; Baade, Is There an Economic Rationale for Subsidizing Sports Stadiums? HEART-
LAND INSTITUTE POLICY STUDY No. 13 1 (Feb. 23, 1987). Baade maintains that in the long
run entertainment dollars are fairly constant and if not spent at a sporting event, due to the
absence or departure of a sport's franchise, those leisure dollars will simply be spent in that
same municipality on other leisure activities. Id. at 18.
Thus, there appears to be a financial impact from both the general economic standpoint as
well as from an employment perspective. Further, there is an unascertainable impact that the
presence or loss of a franchise has on the individual municipality from a psychological perspec-
tive. In separate commentaries by Professor Baade and Professor Roberts, both maintain that
it is in many ways worse for a city's image to lose a major league team than to have never had
one at all. See Baade, supra, at 1; Roberts, supra, at A16, col. 3.
The important factor is that the contractual relationship between a franchise and a league
has an effect, probably financial, upon municipalities which necessarily affects its resident fans.
If there is no stability in the league-franchise relationship, municipalities have little recourse.
See supra note 54.
This financial and emotional impact, in conjunction with the league-franchise fiduciary
relationship, further reflects the necessity of encouraging stability and establishing a degree of
certainty regarding sports franchise relocations.
128. See supra text accompanying note 127.
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impact on the stability of sports franchise locations.129 Even baseball, a
sport that has not been affected by relocations in this decade, was con-
fronted with the possibility of the Chicago White Sox moving to St. Pe-
tersburg, Florida.
1 30
The most problematic result stemming from the Raiders and Clip-
pers cases, however, is the new-found "franchise-free agency. ' 131 Gener-
ally, it is not in the leagues' overall best interest to make an unreasonable
decision on a relocation request.1 32 However, a franchise may exploit the
opportunity for individual short-term gains that result from a relocation
without regard to the league's overall best interest. 133 A franchise like
the Clippers may feel free to relocate when an opportunity arises even if
it does not receive league approval.134 A franchise knows that if an ac-
tion is brought against it, it may have to pay only the increased value of
the franchise location, with no threat of having to pay more.' 35 A
franchise is thus confronted simply with a "pay-now-or-pay-later" situa-
tion. All that a franchise may be required to do is to compensate its
league for the value of the geographic franchise-location taken, minus the
value of the franchise-location it turned in.' 36 This effectively allows an
129. With the law in this condition, a league may continue to unreasonably ban franchise
relocations and hope that a court will interpret their relocation request denials as objective. If
a relocation request denial is interpreted as subjective, full treble damages are not a threat.
Although damages will be offset by the increased value of the relocated franchise as ordered in
Raiders II, leagues must hope that the increased value of the new franchise location will exceed
the damage award prior to trebling.
130. See Swift, The Sunshine Sox, SPORTS ILLUSRATED, May 30, 1988, at 40.
131. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
132. In addition to the potential antitrust damage consequences, a league has no financial
incentive to make a bad decision.
133. Although a more attractive lease or increased gate and concession revenues may bene-
fit a franchise and its balance sheet, these types of income do not increase the shared revenues
of the league. See supra text accompanying note 28.
134. The Los Angeles Raiders have announced that they plan to relocate again. Without
NFL consent, the franchise announced plans to move to Irwindale, California. The Irwindale
group has provided the Raiders with several incentives including a gross stadium revenue
guarantee of $2.5 million per annum. Sports Indus. News, Sept. 11, 1987, at 286. Also, ac-
cording to Irving Azoff, one of the new private managers of the Los Angeles Coliseum, the
NFL's Los Angeles Rams have asked about the possibility of returning to the Coliseum. Rams
Backtracking?, U.S.A. Today, Aug. 4, 1988, at C-I, col. 1. The Rams left the Coliseum in 1980
to play in Anaheim Stadium. Id.
In addition, the owner of the NFL's Phoenix Cardinals, Bill Bidwill, openly met with
officials from Baltimore, Maryland, Phoenix and Tempe, Arizona, among others, to discuss
the franchise's relocation without first seeking league approval. Sports Indus. News, Nov. 6,
1987, at 350.
135. There is precedent for having to pay nothing. When the former Baltimore Colts
moved to Indianapolis, no action was brought by the NFL, and no payments were reported to
have been made. See Wong, supra note 6, at 18.
136. See supra note 121.
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individual franchise to make a franchise relocation decision on its own,
without considering the league as a whole.
137
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: COMPENSATION FOR USURPATION
PLUS PuNrrivE DAMAGES AS A DETERRENT
A. League Structure: League-Franchise Fiduciary Relationship
Compensating a league for usurping a league-developed opportu-
nity, as well as awarding punitive damages against a franchise would de-
ter franchises from relocating without league approval. However, in
order to award damages for usurpation, as well as to award punitive'
damages, a court would first have to examine the relationship of the par-
ties. The initial discussion in this section contends that the league-
franchise relationship is fiduciary in nature. Because of this relationship,
compensatory damages for usurpation of a league-developed opportunity
and punitive damages for breach of contract should be available in
franchise-relocation cases.'
38
Team owners in all sports are members of a select group.139 None
would dispute the fact that the success of a league, and thus of the indi-
vidual franchises, largely depends upon the degree of cooperation among
member franchises."4 The primary purpose of professional sports league
rules regulating relocation is embodied in the philosophy espoused by
NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle: "One of the key things a sports league
needs is unity of purpose. It needs harmony .... When you have unity
and harmony and move basically as one, you have a successful sports
league." 14' This philosophy is further amplified by commentators who
argue that a professional sports league is not a group of individual busi-
137. Id.
138. See infra text accompanying notes 166-228.
139. See Levin v. National Basketball Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 149 (1974), where the court
recognized that a league could be selective as to who may enter their "partnership." When a
franchise is available, the price is high. See Greyhound Partners Agree to Buy Phoenix Suns Pro
Basketball Team, Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1987, at 38, col. 5 (partnership paid $44.5 million for
existing franchise that was originally purchased in 1968 for $2 million; Boston Celtics are
valued at $120 million). In 1987, the NBA granted franchises to the following cities for $32.5
million each: Charlotte, North Carolina; Miami, Florida; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Or-
lando, Florida. See Sports Indus. News, June 5, 1987, at 130. The most recent franchises to
join the National Football League were the Seattle Seahawks and Tampa Bay Buccaneers, who
joined in 1976 for between $16-17 million each; see also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990
(1984) [Raiders I]. The publicized "asking" price for the NFL Dallas Cowboys franchise is
$200 million. See Duke, Like Many Other Texas Institutions, The Cowboys Haven't Found A
Buyer, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1988, at 16, col. 1.
140. See R. BERRY & G. WONG, supra note 1, at 1-4.
141. D. HARRIS, supra note 16, at 13-14.
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nesses, but a single business entity. 4 2
There is much confusion in sports cases regarding the single entity
issue. 143 The problem stems from the unique nature of sports leagues.
Although the individual franchises, and necessarily their owners, are
quite competitive on the playing field or in the arena, cooperation among
franchises exists in the overall management of a league. 1" Professor
Roberts has noted that confusion concerning the economic structure of
sports leagues is caused by the mistaken equation of a "sports league"
with the "service organization each league creates to perform certain
functions that are better left to administrators than to the league's quasi-
legislative governing body." 1 45 These administrative functions include
"scheduling, resolving disputes among players and franchises, supervis-
ing officials, discipline and public relations." '146 The interactions of the
clubs are not necessarily analogous to the functions of the league office.
A key element in this confusion is that the league office traditionally car-
ries the name of the league itself such as the "National Football League"
and the "National Basketball Association."147 Commentators are quite
correct when they state that a league does not precisely resemble any
standard form of organization.1 4  Although the leagues have not been
set up as partnerships, many view that form of association as the best
approximation of the way in which the leagues operate.1
49
The confusion regarding franchise cooperation and the function of
the league must not obscure the belief that the league franchise relocation
rules should be designed to promote the financial success of all league
members. The geographic placement of franchises obviously has an ef-
142. See, eg., Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust, the Rule of
Reason and the Doctrine ofAncillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 943 (1988); Lazaroff, The
Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53 FORDHAM
L. Rnv. 157 (1984); Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity
Under Section I of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MIcH.
L. REv. 1 (1983).
143. Id.
144. Id. This unity was exemplified in 1987 by the unity of owners during the NFL players
strike. See Lancaster & Barnes, As NFL's Replacement Games Kick Off, Both Sides in Strike
Feel Costs of Tactics, Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1987, at 26, col. 4.
145. See Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to
Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. REv. 219, 241 n.72 (1984).
146. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1389.
147. Roberts, supra note 145, at 241.
148. Id.
149. See generally Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH.
L. REv. 1 (1983). See also Levin, 385 F. Supp. at 152 (equating joint venturers in the NBA
with a partnership). But cf Roberts, supra note 145, at 225 (insisting that a league resembles
no other business entity "including a partnership").
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fect on the development of regional rivalries as well as on whether the
sport is exposed to new geographic regions to increase the television
audience.150
Outside of the antitrust context, courts have clearly recognized that
franchises must rely so much upon each other for their success that their
relationship should be viewed as fiduciary in nature. In Professional
Hockey Corp. v. World Hockey Association,'5 ' the court held that the
franchises within the National Hockey League (NHL) owe fiduciary du-
ties to each other.'52 Referring to the relationship among World Hockey
Association franchises, the California Court of Appeal stated that "there
is a duty of loyalty which requires directors-trustees not to act in their
own self-interest when the interest of the corporation will be damaged
thereby." 153 The fact that the NHL league office is organized as a Dela-
ware non-profit corporation had some bearing on the court's determina-
tion that a fiduciary duty exists.
The court also noted in dicta that a fiduciary duty exists in other
leagues as well. 154 The court rejected the hypothetical suggestion that
former San Diego Chargers owner Gene Klein owed no fiduciary duty to
Los Angeles Raiders owner Al Davis. 5 5 The National Football League,
unlike the National Hockey League, is an unincorporated association;
however, the court implied that a fiduciary duty exists among its mem-
bers as well.' 56 That same court stated that "irrespective of the competi-
tive personal feelings of the various owners of teams may have towards
each other.., they have a duty to make decisions for the benefit of the
... league as a whole."'
157
A court's desire to put a league's goals ahead of the individual own-
150. Television revenues are a primary source of income for most leagues. See supra text
accompanying note 28. An increased viewership obviously gives a sports league increased
leverage in subsequent negotiations with television networks.
151. 143 Cal. App. 3d 410, 415-16, 191 Cal. Rptr. 773, 776-77 (1983). The actual facts of
this case are of little import here. The case involved an approval of a sale by the World
Hockey Association Board of Trustees. See also J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3,
wherein the authors state that: "[t]he court's asserted standard appears to ascribe a type of
behavior to club owners that is more subservient than is the case in the real world." Id at
Supp. § 3.15, at 46 (1985).
152. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 415, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
153. Id. The fact that the NHL league office is organized as a Delaware non-profit corpora-
tion had some bearing on the court's determination that a fiduciary duty exists. Id. at 415-16,
191 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
154. Id. at 415, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
155. Id. It is commonly acknowledged in the industry that Gene Klein and Al Davis do
not like each other. See generally G. KLEIN, FIRsT DOWN AND A BILLION (1986).
156. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 416, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
157. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 415, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
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ers' has merit.' Even if the requirement to always act in the league's
best interest-sometimes to the individual franchise's own detriment-is
harsh, the court at least established a minimum standard of conduct
under which a franchise may not act to harm the league.
The California Court of Appeal is not alone in believing that a fidu-
ciary relationship exists between a professional sports league and its
franchises. Commentators agree with the court that the relationship be-
tween a professional sports league and its franchises should be viewed as
a fiduciary one similar to other fiduciary relationships, such as partner-
ships.' 9 Elaborating on this belief, Professor Roberts has remarked that
"there is no other economic entity incapable of producing revenues with-
out another entity in the same business."'"
Elementary partnership law provides that partners owe each other a
fiduciary duty.' 6' Assuming the validity of the partnership/sports
league-franchise analogy, partnership law indicates that franchises of a
sports league owe fiduciary duties to each other and to their league. In
Meinhard v. Salmon, 62 a classic case decided by the New York Court of
Appeals regarding fiduciary duties within a partnership, a joint venture
was formed to operate a hotel lease. The defendant then unilaterally ne-
gotiated a lease renewal, failed to reveal it to the plaintiff, and took the
new lease opportunity for himself, acting in his own self-interest. 163 The
court held that the defendant breached his fiduciary relationship to the
other members of the partnership. 1' In his opinion, Judge (later Justice)
Cardozo remarked on the taking of the opportunity that: "Many forms
of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties."' 161 Thus, once it
is accepted that franchises and leagues owe each other fiduciary duties, a
number of causes of action and damage theories become applicable to the
franchise relocation scenario.
B. Usurpation of a League-Developed Opportunity
as a Proper Cause of Action
No court has yet specifically held that a league should be compen-
158. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, Supp. § 3.15, at 48.
159. Id. at 47; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 235-38 (1983).
160. Roberts, supra note 145, at 227-28.
161. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 68 (1968).
162. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
163. Id. at 462-63, 164 N.E. at 546.
164. Id. at 463, 164 N.E. at 546.
165. Id at 464, 164 N.E. at 546.
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sated for the taking of a geographic location.166 The following discus-
sion, however, sets forth a justification for recognizing such a cause of
action.
In Raiders 11,167 the court noted that a team could not usurp "the
value of the league's expansion opportunities [which] belonged to the
league as a whole."' 168 This statement indicates that there is some recog-
nition by the courts that a geographic franchise location is a by-product
of the league-partnership and thus, the property or opportunity of the
league, similar to the hotel lease in Meinhard v. Salmon.
169
Where a usurpation of a partnership opportunity occurs, the viola-
tors are required to compensate the partnership for the amount taken.
1 70
Therefore, in the franchise relocation context, a franchise should be re-
quired to compensate the league for the taking of a "partnership" oppor-
tunity. However, courts thus far have stopped short of declaring that a
taking of a franchise opportunity requires reimbursement for the tak-
ing.171 As previously noted, the Clippers and the National Basketball
Association settled out of court before this issue could be decided on
remand. 172
Even if courts award compensatory damages for the taking of a
franchise opportunity, does the award of damages adequately deter
franchises from relocating without league approval? The primary con-
cern of a league is to prevent these takings from occurring at all. 17 3 In
terms of preventing opportunistic takings of league-developed opportuni-
ties by a franchise, courts must have the power to award more than mere
compensatory damages. If not, teams such as the Clippers may relocate
when it is in their own best interest, and not necessarily consider the best
interest of the league and its member franchises.7 4 A solution may be to
award punitive damages against franchises that relocate without first ob-
taining their league's permission.
166. National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc. [Clippers], 815 F.2d 562, 570
(9th Cir.), cert dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 362 (1987); see also text accompanying note 121.
167. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 1356
(9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 92 (1987).
168. Id. at 1371.
169. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
170. Meinhard, 249 N.Y. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546.
171. See Clippers, 815 F.2d at 570.
172. See supra note 123.
173. The injunction option has not been the most successful legal tool for a league. The use
of an injunction has simply triggered an antitrust action by the affected franchise.
174. The Phoenix Cardinals might have moved unilaterally if they had not received league
approval.
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C. Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract
1. Contract damages: the American rule
The general rule has long been that there is no recovery beyond
compensatory damages for a breach of contract. 7 ' The American rule,
supported by law and economic scholars,'76 maintains that only damages
that compensate the non-breaching party for his or her expectation inter-
ests at the time of entering into the contract should be awarded to an
aggrieved party. Of course, tort law, on the other hand, recognizes that
utilizing damages as punishment for wrongdoers in civil actions is appro-
priate in some cases. 1 7 7 Punitive damages are generally assessable when
the wrongdoer acts maliciously, willfully, wantonly, recklessly or with
conscious disregard for the interests or welfare of others.
178
Supporting the American rule in contract are economic theories of
"efficient breach" that maintain that a party will breach only where there
will be an efficient reallocation of resources.179 Specifically, the theory
holds that a party would not breach unless he or she perceived that the
gain from the breach-would exceed the mandated compensatory penalty
that the law would require to be paid. The net result is that the breach-
ing party gains, the non-breaching party receives the benefit of his or her
bargain, and society as a whole has a positive, as opposed to a negative,
reallocation of resources. 180 The breaching party, in a sense, calculates
the known cost of his or her breach into that decision process.
175. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1932); 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1077, at
438 (1964); see also Sebert, Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based Upon Con-
tract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565, 1600
n.122 (1986). There is also an exception in the recent Second Restatement of Contracts stating
that punitive damages may be awarded in contract if "[t]he conduct constituting breach is also
a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable." RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 355 (1981). See Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1, 12-20 (1982), for a history of the rule limiting contract damages to compensation.
176. See, eg., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93-95, 105-15 (3d ed. 1986); Bar-
ton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972);
Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983).
For specific criticism of the expansion of punitive damages in the commercial context, see
Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
377, 402-06 (1986); see also Geller & Levy, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, A.B.A.
J., Dec. 1, 1987, 88-91.
177. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 205 (1977); W. PROSSER,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9-15 (5th ed. 1984); K. REDDEN,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.6, at 42 (1980).
178. See sources cited supra note 177.
179. Sebert, supra note 175, at 1572. See generally R. THOMPSON & J. SEBERT, REMEDIES:
DAMAGES, EQUITY AND RESII ON, viii-ix (1983).
180. See sources cited supra note 179.
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Punishment has traditionally played no role in contract remedies."8'
In contrast to tort law, contract law maintains that there is "no necessity
for satisfying... feelings and allaying community resentment by fines or
physical punishment."1 2 Thus, if a party breaches a contract, the law
generally does not allow for punishment of the breaching party, and only
requires that he or she pay the non-breaching party compensatory
damages.
Professor Sebert has stated that, "economic theory provides one im-
portant basis for critiquing legal rules"; therefore, "encouraging an eco-
nomically efficient allocation of revenues should be one important
objective of contract remedies."1 3 Professor Sebert's primary concern is
that when the only possible award is compensatory damages, there exists
a potential for under-compensation.18 4 He points out that actual dam-
ages are often difficult to measure. 8 ' For example, how does one ac-
count for potential or lost profits? Obviously, such a concern is not an
improper one in the franchise relocation scenario.
1 86
Coupled with Professor Sebert's observations regarding potential
under-compensation, there is the corollary concern that a party contem-
plating breach may actually be encouraged to breach, because the mea-
sure of damages enforced against the party will probably be low. 187 If
there is a potential for under-compensation, then franchises have little
monetary disincentive to unilaterally relocate. Had there been some po-
tential for punitive damages, the Clippers, for example, may have sought
the NBA's approval prior to relocating. If it had been denied, they might
not have relocated. Although under-compensation may not be the pri-
mary concern in the sports franchise relocation game, it is an important
factor.
181. See sources cited supra note 175.
182. 5 CORBIN, supra note 175.
183. Sebert, supra note 175, at 1572.
184. Id. at 1571-84.
185. Id. at 1575-77.
186. It can be argued that the value of damages is the the value of the most recent franchise
fee charged. In the NBA this would be $32.5 million. However, if the value is that of an
existing franchise, it should be noted, for example, that the Phoenix Suns of the National
Basketball Association sold for $44.5 million and the Boston Celtics have been valued at $120
million. See supra text accompanying note 139. How much is a franchise opportunity worth?
Has the usurpation disrupted some plan by the league to profit from the value of a franchise
location at a predetermined time? What is the value of a turned-in franchise? In some cases, is
the turned-in franchise of any value at all? The NFL has not put a replacement franchise in
Oakland and is therefore not "recouping" that franchise fee. The NBA has not placed another
franchise in San Diego since the departure of the Clippers in 1984. See generally, Sebert, supra
note 175, at 1573-79.
187. Ellis, supra note 175, at 26-31, 33.
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2. Punitive damages in contract: the exception
Deterrence is one of several reasons advanced for awarding damages
that exceed compensation.18 8 Commentators have often cited the power
of punitive damages in deterring undesired activity.18 9 Under the present
compensatory damage-based structure, franchises are not confronted
with any damage remedy severe enough to deter them from their poten-
tially opportunistic behavior.' 90 Therefore, extracontractual damages
could be an effective means to deter arbitrary franchise behavior.
A number of jurisdictions award punitive damages for certain
breaches of a contractual relationship. 191 Most often, extracontractual
damages are awarded in cases where the breach of a contractual duty is
accompanied by a breach of a tort duty owed to the plaintiff.192 The
"act" that sets the stage for punitive damages in contract has acquired a
variety of names since its development, including "contort," 193 "bad
faith breach,"' 19 and "tortious breach of contract." '  In some instances,
punitive damages should be awarded where there is an extensive "depar-
ture from commercially acceptable norms."' 96 Probably the most rele-
188. See Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages." Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS
L.J. 639, 648 (1980). Others include punishment, encouraging private suits, and compensation
for those costs that actual damages may not cover, such as attorneys fees. See Ellis, supra note
175, at 3. Ellis continues that "compensatory damages alone produce less than optimal deter-
rence." Id. at 9.
189. See, eg., Mallor & Roberts, supra note 188, at 648.
190. Obviously, even with offset damage awards, the leagues have experienced greater de-
terrence than the franchises have. By having the award offset, they are still not receiving the
full value they could have received for the franchise location "taken." As noted with the
Raiders, rather than paying $25 million the franchise would pay $13.5 million. Raiders II, 791
F.2d at 1374-75; see also supra text accompanying notes 74-88. Thus a penalty of $11.5 million
is still assessed in addition to the injunction that allowed the move to occur. Id. It is also not
clear that the turned-in franchises actually have any "resale" value at all. Baltimore, Oakland
and San Diego are examples of major league cities that are without franchises after relocations.
The true value to the individual leagues may have been having franchises present in each of
these markets.
191. See generally Sebert, supra note 175. Punitive damages have been awarded for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith in insurance contracts, for promissory fraud relating to
misrepresentation at the formation of a contract, and other areas where an independent tort is
found in addition to the breach of contract. Id. at 1600-29.
192. Id.
193. See generally Note, "Contort': Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance, Commercial Contracts-Its Existence and Desirability, 60
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511 (1985).
194. See generally Note, Damage Measurements for Bad Faith Breach of Contract: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1986).
195. See Note, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive Damages in the Borderland of
Contract and Tort, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 2033, 2046 (1986).
196. Id. at 2036.
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vant causes of action in the league-franchise relocation scenario are
breach of a contract involving fiduciaries and breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. The key, as with the usurpation is-
sue, is for courts to recognize that a fiduciary relationship exists among
league-member franchises.197
a. breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
A number of courts have held that there is an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in every contract which "requires each party
to refrain from doing anything to injure the right of the other to receive
the benefits of the agreement." '198 A primary benefit of sports league
franchising agreements is the potential profits derived from the careful
planning and development of the league-in particular, the placement
and the timing of placement of franchises. When a franchise does not
adhere to a relocation rule, other member franchises may not receive the
full benefit of their bargain.' 9 9
The implied covenant or promise in each contract requires the par-
ties to perform their respective obligations under the terms of the rele-
vant contract in good faith. This covenant has been most frequently
litigated in insurance cases when, for instance, an insurance company in
bad faith fails to pay a claim under a policy to an insured. For various
reasons, including the disadvantaged position the insured is usually in, a
court may deem non-performance or inadequate performance by the in-
surer to constitute a "bad faith" breach of the insurance policy.
2 0°
In some jurisdictions, such a cause of action has expanded beyond
the insurance industry to other commercial contexts as well.2° ' The case
197. It is argued that the same "malice" standard that exists in tort should apply here as
well. See Sebert, supra note 175, at 1629-32 & nn.230-51, where the author cites cases in
Indiana where a breach which is "tortious in nature" is adequate. Professor Sebert suggests
that punitive damages in contract should be awarded in two circumstances:
a) When the breach involved conduct that independently amounted to a tort for
which punitive damages would be assessed under tort law; or
b) When the breach was intentional and the breaching party knew that there was
no legal justification for his nonperformance or breached in reckless disregard of
whether a justification existed.
Id at 1657.
198. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d
1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2 (1987) (quoting Seaman's Direct Buying
Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362
(1984); San Jose Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 723 F.2d 700, 703 (9th Cir.
1984)).
199. For instance, the shared network television revenues may be decreased because a mar-
ket previously occupied was abandoned.
200. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
201. See, eg., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768, 686
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often cited to support this expansion is Seaman's Direct Buying Service v.
Standard Oil Co. decided by the California Supreme Court.2°2 Seaman's
involved a contract between Standard Oil and Seaman's, a ship fuel sup-
ply dealer.203 Under the agreement, Standard Oil was to supply Sea-
man's with its fuel requirements.2 °4 Seaman's sued when Standard Oil
denied the existence of a binding contract between them.205 At the trial
level, the jury awarded Seaman's punitive damages for the tortious
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.20 6
The California Supreme Court reversed the award due to an error in
the jury instructions.2 7 However, the court took the initiative to state
that the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a
tort and is applicable beyond insurance contracts to other contracts with
"similar characteristics. '208 Although the court did not state specifically
what these "similar characteristics" might be, it did cite "public interest"
and "fiduciary responsibility" as possible elements.20 9
In her dissent, Chief Justice Rose Bird stated that courts should
award punitive damages for breach of contract where the breach extends
beyond the reasonable expectations of either party:
A breach of contract may also constitute a tortious breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a situation where
the possibility that the contract will be breached is not expected
or reasonably expected by the parties. This could happen, for
example, if at the time of contracting, the parties expressly indi-
cate their understanding that a breach would be impermissible.
Or, it could happen if it were clear from the inception of the
contract that contract damages would be unavailable or would
be inadequate compensation for a breach.210
P.2d 1158, 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984); see also Temper, Commercial Bad Faith: Tort
Recovery For Breach of Implied Covenant In Ordinary Commercial Contracts, 48 MoNT. L.
REV. 349 (1987) (discussing expansion by the Montana Supreme Court to ordinary commer-
cial contracts in Nicholson v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 1342 (Mont. 1985)).
202. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984); see also Sebert, supra note
175, at 1620 (no convincing reason why only insurance industry should be subject to punitive
damages for breach of contract).
203. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 759, 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. "Since Standard's denial of the
existence of a binding contract would not have been tortious if made in good faith, the trial
court erred in failing to so instruct the jury." Id.
208. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
209. Id. at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
210. Id. at 780, 686 P.2d at 1174, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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In the franchise relocation context, the parties initially expect that
they are entering into a fiduciary relationship. That is, the parties expect
each other to comply with a fair set of rules and further expect that those
rules will be followed and applied in good faith with particular regard to
changing market conditions. Thus, a logical application of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the league-franchise relation-
ship is that a franchise violates the covenant if it relocates without league
consent. Such an action impairs the right of the league to receive the
benefits of the contract.21'
b. the breach of fiduciary duty as grounds for punitive damages
Outside of the professional sports context, there is precedent to sup-
port the contention that breach of contract between fiduciaries is proper
grounds for punitive damages. These cases involve real estate brokers,
partners and trustees.212 The Fifth Circuit case of Palmer v. Fuqua213
involved an action brought by members of a partnership against one of
the partners for the taking of a partnership opportunity. The limited
partners claimed that the general partner had taken property for his indi-
vidual use, without offering the opportunity to the partnership first.
214
The court found that the partner breached his fiduciary duty in taking
the partnership property.215 Citing another Texas case, the court stated:
"It must be borne in mind that we are not here dealing with an arm's
length transaction between strangers but, on the contrary, we are con-
fronted with the relationship between partners who had [a] fiduciary re-
lationship with each other .... 2 16 Based on the breach of fiduciary duty,
the court held that awarding punitive damages against the general part-
ner was proper.217
The court applied Texas law which recognizes a cause of action for
punitive damages for breach of contract in certain instances, -including
211. Conversely, a league may violate the covenant if it bars a relocation for no objective
reason.
212. See, eg., Palmer v. Fuqua, 641 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) (general partner breaches
fiduciary duty to partnership); Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (real estate
agent breaches fiduciary duty); Youngblood v. Mock, 143 Ga. App. 320, 238 S.E.2d 250 (1977)
(agent selling equipment converts equipment to own use); Kirby v. Cruce, 688 S.W.2d 161
(Tex. 1985) (punitive damages awarded for breach of fiduciary duties to other members ofjoint
property venture).
213. 641 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981).
214. Id. at 1142.
215. Id. at 1153.
216. Id. at 1161 (citing Morgan v. Arnold, 441 S.W.2d 897, 905 (Tex. 1969)).
217. Id. The court held that the limited partners were entitled to a constructive trust con-
sisting of the property obtained by the defendant. Id. at 1155.
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those which involve a breach of fiduciary duty.2 8 Thus, when a partner
breaches a contract, he or she also breaches a fiduciary duty. Again, the
relationship of the parties is the important factor.219
In the sports franchise context, the prospective application of puni-
tive damages for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of contract would
encourage franchises that are similarly situated to the Clippers to seek
league approval prior to relocating. Further, the same principles may be
applicable to a league in a Raiders-type case if the league does not objec-
tively review a relocation request. Thus far, treble damages, even with
offset, have adequately deterred leagues from acting arbitrarily on reloca-
tion decisions. Since the original damage award in the Raiders litiga-
tion,220 leagues have been quite hesitant to try and bar franchise
relocations.221 Courts should consider, however, that if unreasonable de-
nials continue to recur, there are legal theories available that may en-
courage leagues to act in a reasonable manner. Punitive damages may be
awarded for breach of contract in the franchise-league context.222
218. Id. at 1160-61.
219. See, eg., Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 720 P.2d 1148 (Mont. 1986) (franchisor has
fiduciary duty to franchisee); see also Spandorf, Gurnick & Fern, Implications of Good Faith:
Its Extension to Franchising, 5 FRANCHISE L.J. 3 (1985). Curiously, it appears that the expan-
sion has usually applied in awards against franchisors and not franchisees. See Wulff,
Franchising Currents, 6 FRANCHISE L.J. 11 (1986).
220. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 725 F.2d 1381
(9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
221. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
222. Another possibility is to award treble damages and not offset until after trebling, rather
than before as was done in Raiders II. See Raiders II, 791 F.2d at 1374. By doing so, the
monetary impact of the antitrust damage award is significantly increased. Apart from this
deterrent effect, there are also strong legal arguments for offsetting after trebling.
The historical purpose of treble damages is not clear. The legislative history behind the
treble damage remedy has been called "unilluminating" and the basis for it is "shrouded in
mystery." See Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61
TUL. L. REv. 777, 782 (1987).
The legislative theory behind treble damages indicates that the potential remedy provides
motivation for the private litigant to bring an antitrust action. Id. at 783. As previously noted,
offsetting before trebling at least takes a substantial bite out of the size of the antitrust award.
Although encouraging suits in the franchise versus league context is probably of little impor-
tance, leagues should be compelled to make objective analyses of franchise relocation requests.
The offset of antitrust damages before trebling may serve as an adequate deterrent; how-
ever, if in the future that proves inadequate, some consideration should be given to the dissent
in Raiders II. See Raiders II, 791 F.2d at 1376-81 (Nelson, J., dissenting). The dissenting
judge in Raiders II observed that the majority, by offsetting the antitrust damage award before
trebling, "effectively require[d] the Raiders to pay the league three times the value of an oppor-
tunity that was only once received." Raiders II, 791 F.2d at 1379 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis in original). In a footnote, Judge Nelson articulated a logical extension of the majority's
pre-trebling offset:
What if the Raiders had not sought injunctive relief? In that case, there would be no
question of offsetting the value of an equitable remedy. First, the Raiders would
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3. The impact of extracontractual awards in sports relocation cases
The clearest evidence of the potential impact of extracontractual
damage awards is the reaction of the major sports leagues to franchise
relocations following the Raiders litigation. For example, when the Bal-
timore Colts relocated to Indianapolis without the permission of the Na-
tional Football League, 2 3 the NFL did not seek to prevent the move.22
The most likely reason for the league's inaction was the large antitrust
award issued against the NFL in the Raiders' action. 25 Other franchises
formally reserved their right to unilaterally relocate.226 Also, when the
Cardinals franchise sought to relocate, the NFL owners begrudgingly ap-
proved the request alluding to the deterrent effect of the damage award in
the Raiders litigation.227 The impact of the Raiders litigation has even
extended to other sports leagues, such as the National Basketball Associ-
ation. When the Clippers franchise sought to relocate, the NBA did not
take any immediate action to halt the Clippers' relocation, as the NFL
had during the Baltimore franchise relocation.228
The reaction of leagues to the Raiders litigation illustrates that par-
ties' conduct in a league-franchise relationship can be influenced by the
availability of extracontractual damages. However, while monetary
damages have been an effective deterrent against leagues blocking
franchise relocations, they obviously have encouraged franchises to op-
portunistically relocate. Thus, a balance must be established by the
courts in appropriate breach of contract cases through the application of
punitive damages. Punitive damages should be available in actions in-
receive three times their actual antitrust damages (i.e., three times the lost financial
advantages between 1980 and 1982 [the period of time which the NFL prevented the
franchise from relocating]). Only afterwards would the court prevent the ongoing
antitrust violation by prohibiting the restraint of the move, but permitting the NFL
to charge the Raiders for the value of the move.
Id. at 1379 n.9 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
The majority noted that there was no precedent for offsetting prior to trebling. Id. at
1374. The court held that offsetting after trebling would allow damages in excess of the inju-
ries caused by the antitrust violation. Id. (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,
429 U.S. 477 (1977)). The court stated that the value of the injunction allowing the move,
together with any monetary damages, would fully compensate the Raiders for their injury. Id
at 1375. The court insisted that there is nothing wrong with an antritrust award with no net
recovery. Id. at 1374.
223. See Axthelm, The Colts: A Cause for Anger, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 9, 1984, at 105; D.
HARRIS, supra note 16, at 602-07.
224. Id.
225. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1386; see supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
226. See Janofsky, Saints Reserve Right to Relocate, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1985, § 1, at 27,
col. 1.
227. See supra text accompanying note 15.
228. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
January 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
volving opportunistic franchise relocations in all professional sports
leagues.
IV. THE REVENGE OF THE SPORTS LEAGUES:
A HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO
Antitrust damage awards appear to be adequate to deter sports
leagues from disregarding their relocation rules.229 In extreme circum-
stances, however, punitive damages may also be used against leagues as
well. Assume that "Franchise," a franchise like the Raiders, has relo-
cated and has had the same success in court as the Raiders-a successful
antitrust action and an unsuccessful contract action for the breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.230 Assume further that the terri-
tory to which Franchise relocated is known as "Metropolis." Franchise
has become anxious again and has engaged in fruitless negotiations with
the Metropolis Stadium Authority. The stadium authority made a
number of promises, on which it is now reneging. "Suburbia," a commu-
nity thirty miles outside of Metropolis, has offered to build a stadium for
Franchise. Franchise accepts Suburbia's offer and moves again without
the consent of the "League." Counsel for Franchise informs it that the
exclusive grant of territory it received initially in its agreement with the
league grants it all territory within a fifty-mile radius of Metropolis.231
With the Metropolis Stadium now open, League encourages another
member-franchise to relocate to Metropolis. Franchise's owner is livid.
He watches his profits plummet as very few fans drive out to Suburbia to
attend games. Franchise again brings an action based on three theories:
antitrust; breach of contract; and punitive damages for breach of contract
in a fiduciary relationship.232
In its first action, Franchise was unsuccessful in recovering under
the bad faith theory, because both parties were held to have acted in bad
faith. The court's analysis in Raiders II provides some guidance for an
analysis of this scenario.
In Raiders II, the court, in reversing the finding regarding the
229. See supra text accompanying note 15.
230. Raiders II, 791 F.2d at 1361, 1363.
231. The territorial rights of a franchise are set out in the league constitutions. The NFL,
for example, defines "home territory" as "the surrounding territory to the extent of 75 miles in
every direction from the exterior corporate limits of such city." NFL CONST. & BY-LAws art.
IV, §4.1.
232. Even with appropriate awards in place, a relocation within a franchise's territory
would be difficult to prevent unless the territory was specifically spelled out in the original
franchising agreement. Id. The important issue in this hypothetical scenario is the action
taken by the league.
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breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, stated that the
implied covenant is "reciprocal" or a "two-way street," demanding that
both parties to the contract must comply with the covenant. 33 The
court went on to hold that there was not enough evidence to support the
jury finding that the NFL acted in bad faith in denying the Raiders the
right to relocate, while finding that the Raiders acted in good faith when
they relocated without the consent of the NFL. 34 The court stated that
a plaintiff could not be successful in a bad faith action where the plaintiff
had also acted in bad faith. 35
It should be kept in mind in this hypothetical scenario that
Franchise is the same franchise that initially acted in "bad faith" by mov-
ing without consent. Would that action apply to this transaction as well
or is a new "transaction or occurrence" involved? Franchise would con-
tend, of course, that this transaction is entirely new and that it is within
the framework and spirit of the league-franchise agreement. Surely fel-
low franchise owners would not want Franchise to be bound to an unfa-
vorable lease. In Raiders II, the court stated that:
Had the Raiders displayed bad faith during a different dispute
with the NFL, a dispute that was unrelated in time and manner
to the proposed relocation of the Raiders franchise, the Raiders
would not have been precluded from recovering for the breach
of the League Agreement in the present case.
236
The obvious question is whether this second move by Franchise is
"unrelated in time and manner" and therefore a "different" dispute.
237
It would seem that it is. Assuming that the dust had settled from the first
relocation, this second move constitutes a new relocation and thus, cre-
ates a "different" dispute.238 Further, this relocation is one that would
appear contractually permissible. If found to be unrelated, this breach by
League could be found to be in bad faith and possibly subject it to puni-
tive damages.
Punitive damages should be available for breach of contract by the
hypothetical league. In Photovest Corporation v. Fotomat Corpora-
tions,239 a photo developing franchise was awarded punitive damages
233. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d
1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 92 (1987).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1362. The court there noted that whether bad faith breaches cancel out each
other was an issue of first impression. Id.
236. Id. at 1363 (emphasis in original).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
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under similar circumstances. In Photovest, the franchisor saturated the
plaintiff's market with company-owned stores in violation of their agree-
ment.2' The court found punitive damages were appropriate because
the franchisor's multiple breaches of contract constituted "an oppressive,
intentional, tortious wrong."241 Ii this hypothetical sports franchise sce-
nario, the grounds justifying punitive damages would be even stronger
because of the greater sharing of revenues and need for interrelation
among the teams than was necessary among the Fotomat franchises.242
Clearly, there is no need for another Fotomat to exist for one to..stay in
business. In marked contrast, it would be impossible to hold a sporting
event with only one team.243
In the hypothetical, since there is a breach of a specific clause in the
league-franchise agreement and no "offsetting" bad-faith breaches by
Franchise, a punitive damage award is appropriate for the breach of fidu-
ciary duty. All factors concerning the relocation, of course, should be
considered. Clearly, if League's placement of Franchise in Metropolis is
actually in League's and Franchise's best interests, then awarding puni-
tive damages would not be appropriate. In that case, compensatory dam-
ages would be possible for whatever loss could be calculated for the
breach of the territorial exclusivity provision in the franchising
agreement.
V.- CONCLUSION
With appropriate remedies available, opportunistic sports franchise
relocations should occur less frequently because there would be a genuine
penalty assessed, hopefully serving as a deterrent to breaches of the vari-
ous league constitutions and by-laws and the corresponding fiduciary du-
ties that they create. The goal of inserting punitive damages into
franchise free agency is to prevent opportunistic and unreasonable ac-
tions by franchises and leagues. With punitive damages available, indi-
vidual franchises will have an economic incentive to seek league
permission prior to relocation; in fact, the economic incentive will en-
courage franchises to comply with the established, objective league
guidelines. These same principles will deter unreasonable league actions
as well.
240. Id. at 728.
241. Id. at 729.
242. See Roberts, supra note 145, at 250.
243. Id.
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